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In the Supreme Court 
of the State 1Jf Utah 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
GENERAL DETERMINATION 
OF RIGHTS TO TI-IE USE OF 
ALL \rATER, BOTH SURFACE 
AND UNDERGROUND, IN rrH:BJ 
ESCALANTE VALLEY DRAI~­
AGE AREA, 
In re: Water User's Claim No. 483, 
Underground Water Claim No. 7664, 
Walter W. Cook, Claimant. 
\YALTER 'N. COOK, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs . 
• TOREPH ~I. TRACY, State 
Engineer of the State of Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 8G25 
STATE~IENT OF TIIE BRIEF 
This cause is before this Court as an intermediate 
appeal or an appeal from an interlocutory order made and 
entered by the Fifth Judicial District Court of the State 
of Utah, in and for Iron , County, involving a well and 
underground water right of the appellant, Walter \V. 
Cook. 
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As indicated by the title of the case, a proceeding 
was originally initiated as a general adjudication of 
all of the rights to the use of water in the Escalante 
Valley Drainage Area: in Utah, which includes the :Milford 
Underground water basin immediately south of the City 
of :\filford in Beaver County. 
After complying with th,e provisions of Chapter 4 of 
Title 73, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and after completion 
of a hydrographic surYey of the area, the State Engineer 
on or abont the 1st day of April, 1949, served and filed in 
the District Court of Iron County his Proposed Determi-
nation of Water in said area. 
In the due course of said general adjudication pro-
ceedings, and on or about the 6th day of October, 1943, this 
appellant, then the owner of said premises, filed a state-
ment of water user's claim in this proceeding as provided 
by statute, and said statement of claim 'Yas by the Clerk of 
the District Court assigned a number, to-wit, No. 483; 
and thereafter by the said proposed determination the 
elaim was wholly disallowed by the State Engineer. There-
upon the claimant filed his objection and protest to the 
(li~allowanre of his ~Yell and underg:round water right 
claiming that he was the owner of a forty acre tract of 
land; that in the month of ~-\ pril, 1924, his predecessor in 
inten•st commenced to rlrill and sink a well on the said 
premis0s and during the month of l\Iay, 1924, completed 
the said wP11; tlwt tlw well wns afterwards equipped with 
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3 
proper pumping equipment and in l\Iay of said year water 
from the well beneficially used in the irrigation of forty 
acres of land and that such beneficial use of the waters 
from the said well continued during the irrigation season 
of said year; that the flow from said well was one second 
foot of water. 
Thereafter a hearing \Vas duly held by the Distriet 
Court on the said protest, after which the Court made and 
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law and an 
interlocutory order (Tr. 12-14), denying the claim and 
protest of the appellant. 
A petition for interlocutory appeal from said orders 
was filed in accordance 'vith and as provided by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (Tr. 1-6) and which appeal was 
duly allowed and granted by order of said Court (Tr. 15-
17). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the follo\ving statement of facts it is not deemed 
necessary to re-state those which are incorporated in the 
foregoing statement of the case, many of which are taken 
almost bodily from the trial court's findings and conC'lu-
sions (Tr. 12-13). 
While the State Engineer and the claimant and ap-
pellant herein differ as to the correctness of the court'~ 
conclusions of law and the interlocutory order based 
thereon, there is no controversy whatsoever eoncerning 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
the facts. 
The said findings of fact,_ the pertinent portions of 
which, insofar as this controversy is concerned, are briefly 
as follows: 
1. That on or about the 6th day of October, 1943, the 
claimant, Walter W. Cook, filed a statement of water 
user's claim in the general adjudication proceedings and 
the statement of claim was assigned No. 483, and by the 
proposed determination of the claim was wholly disal-
lowed by the State Engineer (Tr. 12-13). 
2. That the claim was based upon underground water 
claim No. 7664, which claim, as filed on March 12, 1936 by 
Theodore Kronholm (predecessor in interest to appel-
lant), showed that a well was drilled on the property in-
volved in April and ~fay of the year 1924 and that water 
from the well was used to irrigate forty acres in the year 
1924, with a flow of one second foot of water. ('rr. 13j. 
3. That there was no use of water from the well during 
the year 1930 or at any tin1e subsequent thereto prior to 
l\Iarch 22, 1~):~5, t.he effective date of the 1935 act dealing 
with underground water. (Tr. 13). 
4. That no contention is made by either party, includ-
ing tlH' StntP Engineer, that the appellant intended to 
abandon the use of the water from the well and no finding 
wuH made ns to abandonment. (Tr. 13). 
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From the foregoing findings of facts the trial court 
concluded: 
1. That failure to use water from the well during the 
years 1930 to 1934, both inclusive, constituted non-use for 
a continuance period of five years and resulted in for-
feiture of the right under the provisions of the laws of 
Utah then in full force and effect. (Tr. 13). 
2. That the action of the State Engineer in disallo,ving 
the claim of appellant should be approved and confirmed 
(Tr. 13). 
Thereupon the interlocutory orders appealed from 
was made and entered by the trial court (Tr. 14). disal-
lowing the claim of appellant thus leaving him without 
the right to use any water whatsoever from his well. 
A very short hearing was had before the trial court 
on June 9, 1954, and a transcript thereof is made a part 
of the record on this appeal (Tr. 1-5). 
The testimony given at the hearing is fairly reflected 
in the findings. The claimant testified that he is the owner 
of the premises formerly a part of a tract owned by Th8o-
dore Kronholm; he acquired the title to the premises 
around 1938 or 1939; that Kronholm used water from tho 
well to irrigate forty acres for some time after the well 
was drilled in 1924 and that there was no irrigation from 
the well in 1930 or subsequent thereto, but that all of the 
irrigation was prior to 19:~0. (Tr. 2-4). 
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It was agreed at the hearing that the State Engineer 
made no issue to the acreage previously irrigated (Tr. 4), 
and that there was presented to the court the legal prob-
lem of as whether the well right was lost through non-user 
(Tr. 4). 
The findings (Findings :No.7, Abs. 13) removes from 
the problem before the Court any issue as to voluntary 
abandonment, since the State Engineer did not claim and 
does not now claim any loss of the well right because of 
abandonment. 
The proposed determination disallowing the claim of 
appellant was first filed in the District Court and served 
upon water users in _.:\ pril of 1949. (See notation thereof 
in the exhibit which is a copy of the proposed determin-
ation). 
STATE~IEXT OF ERRORS RELIED OX 
1. The trial court erred in concluding that failure to 
use water from appellant's well during the years 1930 to 
1934, both inclusin_~, constituted a loss of the well right 
through non-use. 
3. The trial court erred in making and entering its 
interlocutor:· order denying the rlain1 and protest of ap-
pPll:mt, "·hich onlcr has the pffcrt of dcpriYing- the ap:pel-
lant of the right to usc tlll• water frmn said well for any 
purpo~·'<' whatsocYcr. 
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ARGUMENT 
The above statement ~pecifies two errors which in 
substance and effect are but one; and the sole question to 
be decided by this Honorable Court is simply this: 
Was a well right prior to the enactment of the under-
ground water act of 1935 considered as subject to the non-
user statute in effect prior thereto; or, put another way, 
did the enactment of the underground water act have the 
effect of foreclosing a well owner from the use of his '"'ell 
through a previous five-year non-use thereof~ 
Appellant contends not. 
Prior to the underground water act of 1935 the non-
user statute provided as follows : 
When an appropriator or his successor in in-
terest abandons or ceases to use water for a period 
of five years the right ceases, and thereupon such 
water reverts t~o the public, and may be again ap-
propriated as provided in this title. :1:100-1-4 
R.S.U. 1933. 
The underground water statute of 1935 amended the 
above section, {Ch. 104, Session Laws of 1935), and tho 
amendment became effective during :March of 1935, before 
the commencement of the irrigation season of that year. 
The amendment incorporated the provisions of :1:100-1-4 
R.S.U. 1933, and added a provision, with appropriate pro-
cedure, whereby before the expiration of such five-yeo r 
period the appropriator or his successor in inten·~t might 
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apply for an application for an extension of time up to 
five years within which to resume the use of such water. 
This amended act concludes with the clause ''provided, 
that nothing in this section shall apply to underground or 
subterranean waters''. 
The Court will observe that we do not pose the ques-
tion: Did the non-user statute in effect prior to the effec-
tive date of the amendment thereof apply, to underground 
water~ We pm;e the question which we deem decisive: \Vas 
a well right prior to the effective date of the amendment 
of the non-user statute considered as subject to the pro-
visions of such statutes~ 
When the office of State Engineer was created and 
the general water act of 1903 \Vas passed ( Ch. 100, Sesswn 
Laws of Utah, 1903), Section 48 thereof was a non-user 
statute substantially as carried forward into Section 100-
1-4, R.S.U. 1933, excepting that the early statute provided 
for a seYen year non-use period in lieu of the present five-
:·par non-use period. 
In January of 1935, in the cases of Wt·athall rs .John-
suu, ~(; Utah .)0, JO Pnc. ~ncl 73;>, and .Jusft'SCJI rs. Olsen, 
Hti Utah 1 :->H, -t-O Pnc. :2nd ~0~. it ,,·as held that the law of 
appropriation applit>s to the waters of subterranean and 
art<'~inn hnsins. Thereafter the Legislature of 1935, large-
1)· on account of t hP holdings in the above two cases, made 
~nhRtantinl ch:mg('S in the \\-ater act of 1903, and added 
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other sections regulating the appropriation and use of the 
waters of subterranean and artesian basins. 
The early statute (t47, Ch. 100, Session Laws of 
Utah, 1903) provided as follows: 
The \Vaters of all streams and other sources in 
this State, whether flowing above or underground, 
in known or defined channels, is herehy declared to 
be the property of the public su"Qject to all exist-
ing rights to the use thereof. 
The 1935 statute (t100-1-1 Session Laws of Utah, 
1935) as amended provides as follo·w·s: 
All waters in this State, whether above or un-
der the ground are hereby declared to be the prop-
erty of the public, subject to all existing- rights to 
the use thereof. 
Again we emphasize the language of the non-user 
statute from 1903 up to and including the 1935 amend-
ment. The statute provides ''when an appropriator ceases 
to use water for a period of five years the right ceases 
and the water may be again appropriated as provided in 
this title." 
The question then is - Until the 1935 enactment, or 
until the \Vrathall case v;a~ decided in 1935, did the courts, 
legislature, bar and the public in general understand that 
the law of 1903 and the procedure to be followed appliell 
to underground water basins~ And as a corollary, - Prior 
to the 1935 enactment was it considered that a well right, 
acquired without the necessity of appropriating the water 
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therefrom, could be subject to the non-user statute, when 
the owner of the well right was not considered an "ap-
propriator." Further, was it considered that water not 
subject to appropriation would revert to the public to be 
again appropriated? 
The answer to the above queries is found in the sev-
eral solemn pronouncements of this Honorable Court. 
This court throughout its history has recog-
nized that percolating waters are not public waters 
but belong to the soil through which they pass and 
are the property of the owner thereof, and are not 
the subject of appropriation. (Citing a long line of 
Utah cases).*':'*"" 
Our concept of what was and what was not 
percolating waters has changed greatly since that. 
term was used in the early cases. In those cases 
·we described percolating waters as not "naturally 
flowing in a stream with a well defined channe1. 
banks and course.'' _-\.gain percolating waters -wete 
defined as "pereolating through the soil, or flow-
ino· in a subterranean stream, ha,-ing no defined or ln~wn ehannels, courses or banks." * * * * Until 
1!):~:> the derision~ of this Court treated the waters 
of arte~ian basins as percolating waters, and as 
fmrh the o1n1trship wcut ll'ith the owners of the 
grouud wlwn.' such wah'rs Wl~re locat~d !lnd w_ere 
unf <'onsidered to be subjl'el to appropnatwn. Rwr-
da 11 rs. Trest ll'Ood, 11.) Utah :213, :203 Pnc. 2nd 92~, 
(lt'eidl'd in 10-t.~l. 
In Riordau rs. Tr,shrood, supra, we noted that 
t.his court lw~ alu·ays recognized that percolating 
Wltf<>r:-; :tre not publi(' waters but an~ a part of the 
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ground through which they pass and belong to the 
owner thereof, ''rith well recognized exceptions to 
such rule none of whirh have a bearing on our 
problem in this rase. \V e also noted that in recent 
years our concept of what are percolating waters 
have undergone great rhange. TV eber Basin liVater 
Co11serrrmcy District rs. Gailc1J, ____ Utah ______ , 303 
Pac. 2nd 271, at page ~7 4. 
In the case ofiianson 1·s Salt Lake City, 115 Utah_ 
404, 205 Pac. 2nd 255, Justice Vol ade has very fully and 
ably discussed the history of water rights in Utah and in 
pointing out wherein the Session Laws of Utah, 1935, 
brought underground water under the jurisdiction of rrhe 
State Engineer and the reasons therefore. Quoting from 
page 238 of 205 Pac. 2nd: 
-''From the earliest times this court has recog-
nized that percolating waters were not subject to 
appropriation as a part of the pttblic waters of the 
state. Such waters were said to be a part of the 
ground through which they passed and belonged to 
the owner thereof the same as the rocks, soil and 
other materials thereof to the lowest depth, and th~ 
o1cner thereof could use such 1,cater as he sa1u fit. 
* * * "' In 1935 the cases of \Vrathall vs. Johnson 
and Justesen vs. Olsen held that the law of approp-
riation applies to the waters of subterranean and 
artesian basins.'' 
Quoting from page 260 of 205 Pac. 2nd, Justice 
\Y ade states : 
"As previom:~ly pointed out prior to the \\' ra 1 h-
all case, the courts, leg·islatun~, lmr and the public 
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in general apparently understood that the law of 
1903 prescribing the procedure to be followed in 
order to acquire the right to use unappropriated 
public 'water did not apply to underground water 
basins. * «, * * It is clear that the legislature did not 
intend, at the time of these enactments (statutes of 
1903) that these statutory provisions should gov-
ern the appropriation of underground waters such 
as are involved in this case because it did not un-
derstand that such water could be appropriated. 
So it made no provision for such a procedure. Later 
this court held that such waters were subject to ap-
propriation and then the legislature amended the 
provisions so as to provide for the appropriation 
of sw~h waters. In the meantime many persons had 
appropriated such waters to a beneficial use and 
no doubt such persons would have complied with 
the statutory regulations had the legislature made 
it clear that such was its intention. It would be a 
great injustice to hold that these people acquired 
no right to the use of such waters by appropriating 
them to a beneficial use because thev had failed to 
comply with statutor~- regulations ~hich the legis-
lature at that time did not intend thev should com-
pi~· with and the courts have held -...v~re not appli~­
a ble to their cat'e. X o one has been harmed by then 
failure to ron1ply with tlwsL~ regulations." 
It is true that in the Hanson case the problem before 
the court was whether a well right could be forfeited and 
deemed lost when the water therefrom had not been 
appropriated. But the principle remains the same. In the 
instant case, if the courts, bar, legislature and general 
public understand that the· law of 1903, including the 
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non-user statute, did not apply to underground water 
basins, and understood that percolating waters were not 
public waters but belonged to the owner of the soil, then 
it would be a great injustice to hold that the well owners 
were ''appropriators'' and that by a non-use of their own 
"private" as distinguished from "public" water it could 
revert to the public to be again appropriated. 
In all seriousness we might ask: vVhat purpose could 
possibly be subserved by a well owner losing a right to 
the use of his own water through non-user, when he could 
immediately thereafter resume the use of his water be-
cause it was not public water and subject to appropria-
tion 1 
And if, prior to the enactment of the 1935 act, a mem-
ber of the bar should be consulted regarding the effect 
of the non-user statute concerning underground water, 
how could such lawyer be expected to advise his client 
that a well right was subject to the non-user statute in 
the light of the decisions and pronouncements of this 
court prior to the \Vrathall case. 
It must be remembered that the 1935 legislative en-
actment was passed and became effective prior to the 
commencement of the irrigation season of 1935. In other 
words, prior to March, 1935, well owners had been led 
"by the courts, legislature, bar and general public" to 
believe their water was not public water and therefore 
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could not be subject to the non-user statute. If the dis-
allowance of the appellant's well right, both by the State 
Engineer and the trial court, shall stand, then the appel-
lant's well right was taken away from him and forever 
lost through no fault of his own and without any notice 
whatsoever, and without being given any opportunity to 
protect his right by resuming the use of the well. 
At this point it is appropriate to comment on the 
fact that the legislature of 1935 did not intend the non-
user statute to apply to underground or subterranean 
·waters because it expressly exempted the same from 
that statute in their amendment to the old non-user stat-
ute, and provided that as to other waters extensions of 
time to use the water could be obtained by application 
therefor. If we can credit the legislature with intending 
to invoke the non-user statute as to underground waters, 
then this inconsistent and absurd situation would be the 
net re~n It : 
\Veil owners who lwd tlrilled their wells and equip-
ped the san1e at large expense and who had established a 
good right but had not used the water for the years of 
19~~0, 1931, 1932, 1933 and 1934, would be summarily 
wiped o11t. But well owners who had u~ed water during 
the ypa r 1 ~l;W, but who had failed to usc the watC'r for 
the ~·t'ars 1931, 1~1;1:.~, 1933 and 1934 w·ould not lose the 
right to the n~C' of ilw wnh'r and could continue thP non-
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use thereof for any number of years thereafter without 
losing the same because the 1935 amendment expressly 
exempted underground and subterranean waters from 
the non-user statute. 1\f oreover, well owners "'hose 
rights were established by appropriation after 1935 would 
be given the benefit of the exemption from non-use, 
while well O\vners with many years of priority were wiped 
out without notice of any kind after being led to believe 
their water was not public water, was not subject to ap-
propriation, but belonged to the owner of the soil. Thus, 
giving a distinct advantage to a later appropriator as 
against an early one is contrary to every concept of our 
water law. 
Since the 1945 legislature amended :1:100-1-4 U.C.A. 
Hl-!3 (Ch. 134, Session Laws of Utah, 1945) by striking 
out the last sentence : ''provided, however, that nothing 
in this section shall apply to underground or subterran-
ran waters,'' underground and artesian waters are now 
subject to the non-user statute. However, after the en-
actment of the 1945 amendment, the State Engineer has 
taken the position, and correctly so, that well owners had 
five years thereafter v:ithin which to resume the use of 
water before he could invoke the non-user statute, and 
at any time before the expiration of such five-year period 
the well owner could apply for an extension of time with-
in which to resume the use of his water. 
The question now before this court, therefore, is one 
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that affects the well rights of the appellant and a Yery 
few other well rights that were similarly disallowed be-
cause of a five-year non-use prior to 1935. After that 
and for a period of ten years non-use of underground 
water was exempted from the effect of the statute, and 
since 1945 there is no question about the loss of an un-
derground right through non-use for five years unless 
an extension of time within which to resume use has been 
applied for and approved. Therefore, as to all well rights 
excepting· those few which were disallowed because of a 
five-year non-use prior to 1935, the question before this 
court is moot. 
The problem here presented seems to be one of first 
impression in this state. The State Engineer, in urging 
upon the trial court the correctness of his position that 
the non-user statute applied to underground ·water prior 
to 1935, h~aned heavily upon the rase of Fairfield ln·iga-
tion Company rs. r'arson, ........... rtah ............ , :2-1:7 Pac. 2nd 
1004. The factual situation in the Fairfield case is far 
different than the ~itnation in the instant case. In the 
Fairfield case the ground on which the wells had been 
drilled was acquired h:· 011e Thon1as through purchase 
from the county, "·hich had acquired the title because of 
non-payment of taxr~. That initiated a new title and the 
~w·<·P~~or in inten'~t of Th01nn~ eommrnred the use of 
ti1P water in l!l33 before tlw effectiYe date of the 1935 
cnneiment. ':Phi~ eonrt. hrlcl that "under our concept 
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prior to the 1935 change, they had the right to use those 
waters as they saw fit without filing an application to 
appropriate them * * * and came squarely within the ex-
ception recognized in the Iianson case.'' The statement 
concerning the loss t;D.rough abandonment and non-user 
of the original right by the driller of the wells was there-
fore not necessary to the ultimate decision and the same 
result would have obtained had this court never men-
tioned or commented on the non-user statute. We be-
lieve it is a fair statement when "\Ve say this court did not 
have in mind when deciding the Fairfield case any situ-
ation such as now presented. 
As a matter of fact, although the word "non-user" 
Is used in the Fairfield case, the water right was ]ost 
through voluntary abandonment rather than non-user, 
excepting as a five-year non-use in that case was neces-
sarily included in the abandonment period of seven 
years from 1905 to 1912. The pumping operation was 
discontinued in the year 1905 ~by the original owner of 
the land on which the wells were located and the water 
company allowed the taxes assessed against the land to 
become delinquent and to be sold to the county for taxes 
and the pump and pipe line were dismantled. The words 
"abandonment" and "non-user" appear to be used to-
gether whereYcr mentioned and nowhere in the opinion 
i~ the question of non-user ever discussed separately or 
otherwise than in connection with the actual voluntary 
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abandonment. ~[oreover, the matter of abandonment 
and non-user are discussed only in the light of the dis-
pute as between two parties and as to which had a better 
right and the express issue of whether non-user could 
apply to underground water in the sense that it would 
revert to the public as public water, was not before the 
court. 
The court in the Fairfield case adhered to its prior 
holding in the IIanson case that prior to 1935 under-
ground waters were considered to belong to the owner of 
the ground on which they were located as a part thereof 
and not public waters or subject to appropriation. The 
court also stressed the fact that in the Hanson case there 
was recognized an exception to the rule that all water 
m,ust be appropriated after 1903, and again reiterated 
the reason for the exception, which was to preYent hard-
ship and injustice to underground water users who were 
misled into not filing an application for appropriation 
and neither the legislature, courts, engineer's office, bar 
nor the general public prior to 1933 intended to require 
sneh an application in underground or well cases. 
n ndcr the exception notL•d in the Hanson case and 
recognized both before and thereafter, a well owner was 
justified in belieYing that he o"~ned tlw water underlying 
his premis<':-> awl that it was not public and not subject 
to appropriation. 'rherefore, he could use or not use 
the wnt<>r as he snw fit without placing it in nny jeop-
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ardy. This situation prevailed until. the moment the 1935 
enactment became effective. In other words, he could 
resume the nsc of his water up to the day, or in fact up 
to the very moment the 1935 act went into effect. The 
very next moment - when the act was effective it ex-
pressly provided that there could be no loss of under-
g-round water. Then at exactly ·vi'hat point does the non-
user apply and come into operation. Appellant contends 
it is not possible to evade the proposition that as to un-
derground water there could be no application of the 
non-user, as distinguished from a voluntary abandon-
ment. 
There appears to be another reason why this Court 
should determine that the appellant has not forfeited his 
well right through non-user, and that the legislature did 
not intend by the 1935 enactment to invoke the non-user 
or forfeiture statute as to underground water rights ac-
quired prior thereto. It is not necessary to cite any 
authority for the fact that a water right of any kind, 
whether acquired through appropriation or otherwise, and 
the priority thereof, is a valuable vested property right. 
It also is elementary that such property right is entitled 
to the same consideration and protection against the im-
pairment and/or loss thereof as any other property. 
The legislature is without power to impair or 
destroy the obligations of contractual or vested 
rights and any statute which affects a vested right 
cannot be given retrospective operation. In re 
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Thrrunm's Estate, 183 Pac. 2nd 97, at Page 103 
(Cal). 
In the ahsenc0 of a clearly expressed legislative 
intent to the contrary, en~ry statute will be con-
strued to operate prospectively, and will not be 
construed to affect pending proceedings unless such 
intention is expressly declared or necessarily im-
plied from its language (Citing cases). Here there 
is no such declaration nor is the intention necessar-
ily implied from the language of the amendment. 
The construction contended for by appellant would 
work an injustice to parties to the pending litiga-
tion, a result which cannot be presumed the legis-
lature intended. The amendment should not be 
given retroactive operation. In re Thramm's Es-
tate, supra. 
While the factual situation is entirely different in 
the case of Toronto vs. Sheffield, 118 l~tah 460, 2:22 Pac. 
2nd 594, the principle of law invoh·ed is the same. In the 
Toronto case this court held unenforceable a statute 
which barred a defense upon the effectiYe date of an 
amendment to a limitation ~tatute without allowing any 
time thereafter within which to bring an action. In our 
case, if the State Enginerr 's position can be sustained, 
the amendment of 1935 as to underground water would 
not onl~· impair but would strike down entirely a Yalu-
able property right ·without aecording the property owner 
an)· time within which to prott>d his right by resuming 
nse of the wah'r. In the Toronto case this court stated: 
"The lt>gi~.;]ature rna~· bar a claim within a reasonable 
timt> within tlH' (•ffret i\·r datt> of tlw statute." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
In the case of TT"esfcrn Ilolding Oo. rs. iVorth-lVcst-
('J"'Jl Land a'ltd Loan Compa1ly, 120 Pac. 2nd 557 (Mont.), 
cited in the Toronto casP, the rourt said: 
The legislature nm~, establish a limitation ap-
plying to a cause of action as to which none existed 
before and may change existing statutes and short-
en period of limitation, but provisions must be made 
allowing reasonable time for actions to be brought 
that otherwise would be instantl:r barred. 
The above legal principles are so well established 
that it is not deemed necessary to multiply the authori-
ties. 
However, we believe this rasr can and should be de-
cided upon the principle that the legislature never did 
intend, when it enacted the 1935 amendment, to declare 
(retroactively) that an underground water right should 
be wiped out instantly by the non-user when the legisla-
ture was well aware, as expressed by this Court in several 
cases, that the courts, the state engineer, the bar and the 
general public were led to believe and did believe that un-
derground water was not public water, not subject to ap-
propriation and belonged to the owner of the soil. 
We apprehend that the respondent may urge upon 
this Court that immediately after the effective date of 
the 1933 amendment, the appellant could have filed an 
application to appropriate water from the well. If such 
position should be urged then the court should bear in 
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mind that (a) there is nothing in the amendment which 
even squints at the fact it was intended to invoke the five-
year non-user statute as against underground water, but 
(b) by the amendment underground water was exempted 
from the effect of the five-year non-user statute; (c) that 
the proposed determination disallowing such water right 
was not issued by the State Engineer until 1949, some 
fourteen years after 1935, which was the first notice 
appellant or any well owner similarly situated had of 
knowing the position taken by the State Engineer; (d) 
the predecessor in interest of the appellant in :March, 
1936, took every precaution to protect his well right by 
filing with the State Engineer the statutor:T underground 
claim; (e) the well owner relied on the pronouncements 
of the Court that his underground water right v~·as not 
public water and belonged to him as the O\\~er of the 
soil. 
Plaintiff and claimant herein respectfully submit 
that the interlocntory order of the trial court sustaining 
the State Engineer should be rcYersed and set aside and 
the well right held not forfeited and lost by reason of the 
1935 amendment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
.Affornry for Appellant. 
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